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A MAJOR incident marred our country's independence ceremony on June 30, 1960. It
involved two radically different readings of the evolution of the Belgian Congo from
colonialism to independent statehood. In a patronising and basically insulting speech.
King Baudouin I, the Belgian monarch, stated that the Congo's independence was the
culmination of the civilising mission begun by his grandfather. King Leopold JJ, in
1885. Shocked by the King's paternalism and President Joseph Kasa-Vubu's apparent
acquiescence in his distorted reading of history, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba made
history with an unscheduled but brilliant speech to set the record straight. He proceeded
to show that the independence being celebrated was a major victory in the struggle for
freedom by our people. His insistence on a politically correct reading of history as well
as on underlying the people's role as its makers, was eventually going to cost him his
life-1
This paper attempts to show the crucial role that ordinary men, women and young
people have played in the democracy movemen in Zaire, formerly the Congo, from the
days of Belgian colonialism to the present time. Although the initiative for political
action came from outside the popular classes, it Is always the latter's resistance that has
sustained the movement and enabled it to weaken the enemy. The popular character of
the struggle for democracy is manifested through its reliance on memories of earlier
resistance to oppression and on the ideas and values of popular culture, which are
basically expressed through a religious discourse.2
The democracy movement in Zaire is a struggle for political freedom and economic
prosperity. That these two go hand in hand has never been in doubt there, given the
character of Belgian rule as a colonial trinity of the state, the Catholic Church and large
companies as well as the continuation of economic exploitation, political repression and
cultural oppression under neo-colonialism. Thus, the independence struggle of the
1950s, the popular insurrections for a "second independence" in the 1960s and the
current struggle for multi-party democracy have, as a common denominator, the
demand for expanded rights politically and for a better life socially and economically.
The paper will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the democracy movement in
each of its major phases: the independence struggle, from 1956 to 1960; the "second
independence" movement, from 1963 to 1968; and the ongoing struggle for multi-party
democracy, since 1980. My working hypothesis is that each phase has failed to fulfill
the people's aspirations because the masses have been incapable of making their own
revolution. They have placed too much confidence in a political leadership whose class
interests and political culture are in contradiction with popular aspirations for
democracy and economic development.3
BELGIAN COLONIALISM AND THE ANTECEDENTS TO THE
ZAIREAN DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT
During the post-war years of political awakening in colonial Africa, the situation
remained relatively calm in Zaire until 1959. The Belgian Congo was known during
that time as a "model colony", the colony that works and where "the natives have happy
smiles". Trains were clean and ran on time, with black conductors and engineers. But
black passengers were segregated in simple fourth and third class cars while whites
enjoyed the luxury of second and first class cars. A network of well-built albeit dirt
roads connected all corners of the vast country, which could be reached without trouble
by motor vehicle. And under the Belgian policy of paternalism and urban stabilisation,
workers and their families received housing, food rations and other social services to
compensate for low salaries.
This was especially true for company towns in or outside major urban centres. In
addition to owning bicycles, phonographs and radios, urban residents could enjoy
wonderful entertainment each weekend in bars/dancing halls or at soccer matches.
Travel between provinces required a pass, and visits to relatives in mining areas- were
strictly controlled, with visitors allowed no more than three weeks in most instances
and required to report to company police upon arrival and to show the pass anytime
upon request.
The rural areas were less tightly controlled but did not escape the vigilant eye of the
Belgian territorial'administrators and their allies (missionaries, company officials,
European settlers) and subordinates — the African chiefs. General purpose
administrators (Commissaires de district, Administrateurs de territoire and Chefs de
poste) could also rely on the support of their colleagues from the departments of
agricultural, education and public health. Thus, even if the traditional land tenure
system was not greatly disturbed, the rural society felt the heavy weight of colonial
economic exploitation, political repression and cultural oppression through the
compulsory cultivation of certain cash crops; heavy taxation; forced labour on public
projects such as road maintenance and the construction and maintenance of guest
houses for itinerant administrators; and the enforcement of numerous regulations on
economic, social and cultural matters. From time to time, and just to frighten people
into submission, a promenade militaire of a week or so was undertaken in entire
districts by the Force Publique, the colonial army. For areas where disturbances had
occurred or were expected, the promenade was replaced by actual military occupation.
Thus did the Belgians manage to keep "happy smiles"' on the faces of "their natives", in
both urban and rural areas. It takes little imagination to understand how such a system
was greatly resented by the African population. It is no doubt because of this
resentment and the resistance it entailed that military exercises were deemed necessary
in many rural districts. As Frantz Fanon has suggested for Africa as a whole, resistance
to colonial rule remained strong in rural Belgian Congo.4 And, consistent with Terence
Ranger's thesis on connections between primary resistance and modern mass
nationalism,5 it was strongest in those areas that had known precedents such as armed
resistance to the colonial conquest. For it is precisely in such areas that mothers could,
with ease, "croon in their children's ears songs to which the warriors marched when
they went out to fight the conquerers.6 But a culture of political struggle would also
arise in areas where prophetic religious movements and peasant resistance to
colonialism were strongest, as in the case of the regions of Lower Zaire (formerly
Lower Congo) and Bandundu (Kwango-Kwilu), respectively.7
It was in Lower Zaire, the central region of the pre-colonial Kongo Kingdom, now split
between Congo, Zaire and Angola, that the first significant event in modern Zairean
nationalism took place. In 1921, a Baptist catechist and a palm oil company worker in
Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville) began a prophetic ministry that went on to influence
the course of events leading to independence nearly 40 years later. The man was Simon
Kimbangu, founder of what his sons and followers would later call iEglise de Jesus
Christ sur la Terre par le Prophete Simon Kimbangu (EJCSK, or the Church of Jesus
Christ on Earth by the Prophet Simon Kimbangu). Today, Kimbanguism is the third
major religious community in Zaire after Catholicism and Protestantism. In addition to
its wide appeal in Congo and Angola, it has established missions in several countries in
Central and Southern Africa.
Why is Simon Kimbangu a nationalist hero and how did his message reflect the
people's aspirations for freedom as well as influence the independence struggle in
Zaire. According to Kimbangu's own testimony, God had appeared to him in a vision
• and asked him to leave his work for the white, man, fight against sorcery and other
negative customs, and lead his people to their liberation from white rule.
There is some evidence that Kimbangu was influenced by what he learned in Kinshasa
from a small circle of people with a reading knowledge of English about articles in
Marcus Garvey's paper, The Negro World. The "Back-to-Africa" idea caught the
imagination of people like Kimbangu, who held popular notions of mpulu or the white
world (Europe and America) as the place where Bakongo go when they die. Now these
very powerful relatives were about to return home to help free their people from white
rule. For Kimbangu and his followers, the realisation of the Pan-Africanist ideal of
"Africa for the Africans" was indeed God's will.
Back in his village, now rebaptised as "Nkamba-Jerusalem", Kimbangu started his
ministry with this radical message, in addition to performing miracles and speaking in
strange tongues. As a result, thousands of workers abandoned their jobs in government
agencies, private companies and white households to see and hear the new prophet at
Nkamba-Jerusalem. As one would expect, the colonial trinity reacted quickly and
vigorously. Kimbangu was arrested, tried and condemned to death for sedition. By
royal decree, the sentence was reduced to life imprisonment. He was sent to the
infamous Kasapa Prison at Lubumbashi (formerly Elisabethville). He died there 30
years later in 1951.
One of the little known facts of Belgian colonial rule in Africa concerns the inhuman
and brutal treatment inflicted on the followers of the Prophet Kimbangu between 1921
and 1959, when Belgium finally stopped the persecution of Khnbanguists and granted
legal recognition to their church.8 Before this momentous event, thousands of
Kimbanguists languished in relegation camps, built in the remotest areas of the country.
Ironically, these detention centres served to spread the messianic message of liberation
to all political prisoners and to the other people with whom the faithful came into
contact.
If Kimbanguism was basically a religious movement with political overtones, its
grounding in the prophetic tradition of the Kongo provided a historically potent linkage
between modern nationalism and the pre-colonial past. Just as the Bakongo's encounter
with Christianity at the height of colonial economic exploitation produced a Kongo
prophet of liberation through a religious discourse, their later encounter with social
change in the post-war era would produce what the masses saw as a new Kongo
prophet, but one who championed the cause of independence through a political
discourse. Joseph Kasa-Vubu, the new leader, was actually trained for the priesthood
but was denied ordination by his Belgian Catholic superiors, who found him to be too
radical. He left the seminary to join the ranks of the middle-level civil servants and
those of the black 61ite known as evolues.
In 1947, Kasa-Vubu made himself known to both the colonial authorities and his
African peers with a militant lecture to an evolue club on "the right of the first
occupant". If the nationalistic orientation of this discourse was clear, it is only after he
became president of the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO) in the early 1950s that he
acquired a mass base for the anti-colonial movement. In the eyes of ordinary people in
Kongoland, Kasa-Vubu was both a successor to the Prophet Kimbangu and a new king
who would resurrect the old kingdom. They called him "Roi Kasa".9
ABAKO was originally created as an association for the promotion and defence of the
Kongo language, Kikongo, then rapidly losing ground in the capital region of Kinshasa
to Lingala, a lingua franca of commerce and popular music also used by the Belgians in
the Force Publique. Under Kasa-Vubu, the organisation soon became a political
movement for the emancipation of the Kongo and eventually all Zairians. Since political
parties were not allowed in the Belgian Congo until the mid-1950s, the politically active
evolue's had to rely on elite clubs and ethnic associations to advance their interests. Of
the two types of organisation, it was the latter which provided them a critical linkage to
the mass of the people. And it is this linkage that made it possible for the democracy
movement to arise in the struggle for independence.
THE INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE, 1956-1960
Thus, it is only when the fight for expanded rights by the evolues found a positive
articulation with the Kimbanguist struggle for religious freedom, the peasants'
resistance to colonial oppression and the workers' demand for better wages and
working conditions that a veritable democracy movement was born in Zaire in 1956.
This is the year that a little known Belgian professor at the Colonial University in
Antwerp, A.A.J. Van Bilsen, published a pamphlet advocating a 30-year plan of
political emancipation for Belgian African — Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi, then known
collectively as Congo Beige et Ruanda • Urundi. If Van Bilsen was denounced by the
defenders of the colonial order as a lunatic and a subversive, the emancipation that he
had wished to prepare so carefully came about only four years later in Zaire, 26 years
ahead of schedule! The abrupt change in Belgian policy was due to the mass factor in
the independence struggle.
There were two notable reactions to the Van Bilsen plan in Zaire. The first came from a
moderate group of Catholic intellectuals known as Conscience Africaine (African
Consciousness).10 This group endorsed the plan and found it to be a good starting
point for political debate on the country's future. The second and more radical response
came from ABAKO, which rejected it and called for a more rapid process of political
change leading to independence. That the ABAKO position reflected the popular will
was confirmed a year later when nearly all the group's candidates swept to victory in
Kinshasa in the first municipal elections ever held in the colony. Given the multi-ethnic
composition of the city's population, the electoral results did show that people from
other ethnic groups shared the political vision of the Kongo-based ABAKO.
The political reforms of 1957 led to the emergence of numerous political parties in
1958. Like ABAKO, most of these parties were ethnically or regionally based.
However, the ethnic or regional character alone did not suffice to define a party
politically and ideologically. A lot depended on its social basis together with the type of
relationship which existed between the leadership and the rank and file. The political
profile of two regionally based parties that were miles apart in terms of popular
mobilisation and nationalist ideology should serve to illustrate this point. The parties in
question are the Confederation des-Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) of
Moise Tshombe and the Panti Solidaire African (PSA) of Antoine Gizenga.
CONAKAT was founded on the premise that the wealth of the rich Katanga (or Shaba)
Province should benefit mainly the "authentic Katangans" or those native to the
province. In reality, the major party theoreticians and financial backers worked behind
the scenes and were to be found among white settlers. The latter saw and used the party
as a vehicle for their long-held dream of a separate political entity likely to close ranks
with the white redoubt in Southern Africa: the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
(Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi), the Portuguese colonies of Angola and
Mozambique, South Africa and Southwest Africa (Namibia). As a secessionist party,
CONAKAT was basically the voice of white settlers through African mouths.
The PSA, on the other hand, was rooted in the peasant radicalism of the Bandundu
region. The history of this region had been greatly marked by the great Pende revolt of
the 1930s, its savage repression by the Belgians, and the resulting myths and cults
build around some of the African heroes of the resistance to colonial economic
exploitation. The region's proximity to Lower Zaire, with which it shared a single
provincial administration based in Kinshasa, together with the use of two of the major
African languages in the country (Kikpngo and Lingala), also meant that the influence
of the Kimbanguist movement was felt there. As a result, the PSA reflected the
radicalism of its rural base and became one of the staunchly anti-colonial centrist parties
aligned with the major nationalist party in the country, the Mouvement National
Congolais (MNC) of Patrice Emery Lumumba.
Founded in October 1958, the MNC grew rapidly by attracting support from all
sections of the population and in all regions of the country. By the end of the year, it
was already competing with ABAKG for mass support in Kinshasa. On Sunday,
December 28, Lumumba held a very successful rally to report to the nation on the
results of the All-African People's Conference that he and. two other national leaders
had attended during that month in Accra, Ghana. Fearing to be overshadowed by
Lumumba's new prominence, Kasa-Vubu scheduled a rally of his own for the
following Sunday, January 4, 1959.
The ABAKO rally was banned at the last minute by the Belgian mayor of the capital.
Despite Kasa-Vubu's urging that the already assembled crowd disperse peacefully, the
people refused and began to attack the security forces, passing white motorists,
Portuguese-owned shops and all other symbols of white privilege and authority. The
rebellion lasted a few days, with dozens of people killed and an enormous destruction
of property. If the 4th of January is a public holiday in Zaire today as "Independence
Martyrs Day", it is because the mass action on that day in 1959 sounded the death knell
of Belgian colonialism in Zaire. "Independence immediate", the slogan of the Kinshasa
protesters, soon became a non-negotiable demand of the democracy movement all over
the country.
The Belgians were extremely shocked by the violence of their presumably happy
subjects. Faced with the people's demand for independence, the lack of political will in
Belgium for an Algerian-type colonial war, and an international context in which
decolonisation was the order of the day, they had to accept the idea of a negotiated
independence. This was the gist of two separate announcements made on January 13,
1959, by both the Belgian king and government.
The masses not only initiated the decolonisation process, they also influenced its pace.
A major reason for the Belgian decision to grant independence in 1960 was the fact that
several areas of the country had become totally ungovernable. For example, people in
rural Lower Zaire and Bandundu had ceased to recognise the authority of the colonial
state, and were willing to take orders only from ABAKO and the PSA, respectively.
They refused to pay taxes and to respect administrative regulations. Some even refused
to have any contact with the social services provided by the colonial state. For the
colonialists, dealing with such a situation meant either the use of coercion to obtain
compliance or letting the situation deteriorate into anarchy, with negative consequences
for all concerned. Since neither alternative was attractive, it was best to accede to the
popular demand for "immediate independence".
It must be pointed out that all the major political leaders, including Lumumba and Kasa-
Vubu, did not interpret this slogan to mean a precipitous decolonisation. At a
conference of nationalist parties held in April 1959 in Katanga (then Luluaboung),
Lumumba had won the endorsement of most delegates for a two-year transitional
process under a provisional government, with full independence to be attained in 1961.
He and others would certainly have convinced the people to accept the authority of such
a government, in which nationals would have shared power with colonial officials. The
Belgians rejected this proposal. Yet, less than a year later, they surprised everyone,
includingthe nationalist leaders, by announcing at the January-February 1960
Roundtable Conference in Brussels that they were ready to grant independence on June
30, 1960. .
What the evidence clearly shows is that the Belgians exploited the radicalism of the
masses to impose on inexperienced politicians an independence settlement that would
be rich in symbolic value but meaningless in content with respect to the people's
aspirations for genuine independence and economic development. By giving power to
people who were not yet prepared to govern effectively, the Belgians gambled that the
Africans would be satisfied with political titles as well as the pomp and ceremony of
high office together with the material privileges which came with it, and leave the real
job of governing the country to Belgian technocrats. Thus, the entire officer corps of
the new national army from second-lieutenant to general remained exclusively white,
and all national office holders, from the President down to local officials, were to rely
on Belgian advisers in the execution of their duties.
This cynical scheme by the Belgians to rob our independence of its true meaning for the
people was a carefully mounted strategy from the very beginning of the decolonisation
process. It involved, among other things: (1) incitation to ethnic hatred, the best known
case being that of the Lulua-Baluba conflict in the Kasai Province; (2) sponsoring an
alternative to the nationalist leadership with an administration-created party of
conservative middle-level civil servants and traditional chiefs, the Parti National du
Progres (PNP), whose initials were derisively used to call it "Parti des Nigres Payis "
and (3) planning and later on managing the Katanga secession.
By the time independence was achieved, the democracy movement was rent by internal
contradictions owing to its own weaknesses and to the destabilising actions of the
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Belgians. The African political class displayed its opportunism by jumping on the
independence bandwagon without a clear understanding of where it led them to, on the
one hand and its inexperience in neglecting to deal with the economic aspects of the
transfer of power, on the other. Whereas all major leaders attended the Political
Roundtable Conference in January 1960, Moise Tshombe of CONAKAT was the only
prominent politician who bothered to go to the Economic Roundtable Conference in
7 April. Yet, it was in this latter meeting that the Belgians sealed the fate of the country.
Negotiating with university students and other delegates relying on Belgian experts to
make sense of the complex issues at stake, the Belgians laid the groundwork for
transferring much of the enormous state portfolios in colonial companies to Belgium
while leaving virtually all the public debt to the new state. Our leaders1 were evidently
true believers in the Nkrumahist gospel of firstly seeking the political kingdom.
As Amilcar Cabral has written with reference to Africa as a whole, the petty bourgeoisie
was the only class that was capable of leading the independence struggle.11 Their
education, experience in the colonial system and knowledge of the outside world
enabled them to articulate the interests of the colonised and to win the confidence of the
masses. In the Belgian Congo, the petty bourgeoisie constituted the first and the only
viable layer of an emerging civil society. The masses were as yet incapable of
producing organic intellectuals likely to carry out negotiations with the colonialists.
They had to rely on the petty bourgeoisie, with whom they shared a common
perception of colonialism as a barrier to the economic, social, political and cultural
emancipation of black people.
Unfortunately, the petty bourgeoisie was more concerned with enjoying the material
benefits that colonialism and the colour bar had denied them than with a radical
transformation of the system in a manner conducive to the realisation of the people's
expectations of independence. Even Patrice Lumumba, the one person who incarnated
the aspirations of an entire nation as the standard bearer of the independence struggle,
was limited by the elitism of his social class and by the political deals and compromises
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he had to make in order to establish a viable coalition government. Witness his
politically incorrect and technocratic position that promotions in the army had to await
proper training. Soldiers and non-commissioned ranks were justified in feeling
discriminated against since, in their eyes, the politicians had undergone no evident
training to become ministers or other high level officials.
The army mutiny, which plunged the country into chaos and brought about foreign
intervention, was yet another manifestation of the people's expectations of
independence. Freedom and material advancement were to be enjoyed by all, and not
exclusively by the civilian population, as the Belgian Force Commander had
provocatively told soldiers at a public meeting a few days after independence.
Everywhere, there was strong resentment by the masses against individuals who were
perceived, correctly or wrongly, as undeserving beneficiaries of independence. Thus,
many citizens with a good education, a car and a nice house were automatically
identified as pro-Belgian PNP members and targeted for punishment through popular
justice. Several men in this category were killed in-September 1960 by women in the
town of Gandajika in Eastern Kasai. Following the tradition of women bathing a corpse
before burial, female militants referred to the execution as "bathing" their male victim
— kumowesha inayi, in Tshiluba.
Lumumba, and through him the entire democracy movement, fell victim to the mutiny
and subsequent events. Powerful forces beyond our borders determined that he
threatened their interests in the region and consequently worked with his local rivals to
eliminate him politically and physically. With his death, the people lost a champion of
their cause as well as their newly found confidence to determine their own destiny. That
confidence would be rekindled during the next phase of the movement in the fight for a
"second independence".
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THE "SECOND INDEPENDENCE" MOVEMENT, 1963-1968
During the electoral campaign of May 1960, politicians had promised to their
constituents literally everything under the sun: no more taxes, houses'in durable
materials, piped water, electricity, free health services, free education, more jobs, better
wages, etc. After Independence Day, people noticed that most of the promises had not
been kept. There were no jobs, houses and modern amenities; the social services
available were deteriorating rather than improving; and taxes of all kinds were still
being collected. In some areas, people were still being required to do forced labour on
public projects such as roads.
Politicians were liars, people said. In many local languages, it became fashionable to
equate lying with "doing politics". Added to this, was a general perception that little had
changed. The whites were gone but the blacks who had replaced them as rulers and
administrators were just as bad, oppressive and at times even cruel. They lived in the
big colonial mansions or villas; drove nice and sometimes bigger and better cars; looked
down on the people; and were quick to use the army and the police to repress any
dissent or questioning of their authority. In many cases, their use of force was uncalled
for and totally arbitrary. They were the "new whites", black in skin but white in their
thinking.
Moreover, the people found out that the new rulers could not hold on to power in the
face of popular discontent without the help and support of the former rulers. Military
assistance, training and even intervention from their friends and allies abroad helped the
new rulers retain control over unwilling subjects. Thus, to fight them also means
fighting against their backers in the international system. However difficult that might
be, it must be done if people are to have genuine freedom and to improve their standard
of living. The first independence had failed.. It was time to fight for a second
independence.
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The foregoing analysis was made by peasants and other ordinary people in Bandundu,
who had been politicised by the PSA during the independence struggle. But the main
outline of their assessment of independence was largely shared by people elsewhere in
the country. What is impressive in this analysis is the clarity of the popular vision of
post-colonial politics — continuity in the functions of the state, its class basis, and its
neo-colonial connection. In this regard, it is also relevant to underline the fact that the
concept of "second independence" is not of academic origin, nor a construct by a
traditional intellectual. It came out of the popular classes, from their own organic
intellectuals. It is interesting to note that this concept is consistent with Amilcar Cabral's
notion of the liberation struggle as consisting of two phases: the national phase, in
which all classes of colonial society unite to fight the colonial system; and the social
phase of reconstruction and transformation, in which the essential aspect of the
problems is the struggle against neo-colonialism.12
Just as during the anti-colonial phase of the democracy movement, even the most
politicised strata of the popular classes had to look to the petty bourgeoisie to provide
leadership and to give organisational form to their permanent aspiration for freedom and
material prosperity. The leadership of the "second independence" movement came
basically from two radical nationalist parties, the Gizenga wing of the PSA and the
Mouvement National Congolais/Lumumba (MNC/L).13 Collectively known as
"Lumumbists", the leaders of these formations had been targeted for elimination from
the political scene by the United States government, which used the United Nations
Mission in the Congo (ONUC) as well as a shadowy clique of local collaborators called
the Binza Group to achieve this aim.14 The group was named after the Kinshasa suburb
where it met, and its core members were Joseph-Desire Mobutu, the army chief and
head of the group; Justin Bomboko, the Foreign Minister; Damien Kandolo, Permanent
Secretary in the Internal Affairs Ministry; Albert Ndele, Central Bank governor; and
Victor Nendaka, chief of the security police. It controlled, with external backing and
supervision, the key organs of national sovereignty and state security.
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Pushed out of the government in 1962-63, harassed and persecuted, Lumumbist
leaders withdrew from Kinshasa to the relative security of Brazzaville, across the
Congo River. It is here that they formed the Conseil National de Liberation (CNL), an
organisation designed to recover through armed struggle the power they had lost back
home. Meanwhile, Pierre Mulele, the PSA leader who had served as Lumumba's
Minister of Education and Gizenga's envoy to Cairo, returned from military training in
China to organise a maquis in the Kwilu district of the Bandundu region. Mulele had
refused to go along with the 1961 reconciliation between the Lumumbists and the
moderate leaders in Kinshasa under the control of the Binza Group, whom he rightly
suspected of treachery. . . . . . . .
Both Mulele and the CNL decided to initiate the mass struggle in areas where the
MNC/L, the PSA and other parties of the radical centrist coalition had been strongest,
namely, Bandundu in the west and the entire northeastern portion of the country,
comprising the regions of Upper Zaire (Kisangani), Kivu, Maniema, Sankuru and
North Shaba/Katanga. However, given the difference in political itinerary and ideology
within the leadership, the "second independence" movement developed as two separate
liberation wars, with separate organisations, command structures and political
strategies. ,
The first and the most radical of the two was the Mulelist maquis in Bandundu. Here
Mulele attempted to systematise the ideas, notions and thoughts of the masses into a
coherent analysis of the situation and a programme of action for purposes of changing it
radically. His systematisation was done through a Marxist-Leninist framework of class
analysis together with a Maoist strategy of political education and guerrilla warfare.15
School teachers, nurses, state and company clerks and secondary school students
formed the ranks of disciplined cadres that he trained for the struggle. Much of what is
known about his teachings comes from the lecture notes taken by trainees. A
remarkable aspect of his doctrine was the insistence on discipline and exemplary
behaviour by the guerrilla, whose objective is to destroy the old order and not to benefit
15
from its material goods. Guerrillas were to respect the people with whom they came
. into contact. They were not to mistreat them or to deprive them of their property. The
major task was the radical transformation of society form the bottom up, on the basis of
well-tested values of village life.
For nearly five years, the Mulelist maquis held its ground against the state. Attacks
were launched on numerous towns and plantations in the region, but the Muielists
never held or occupied a single one, as this was not part of their immediate objectives.
Their earlier successes were so spectacular, including the killing of an army colonel,
that Mulele became a living legend all over the country. He became so famous that CNL
fighters in the east believed he had invented a magical formula for turning bullets into
water, took what a CNL fetishist assured them was the real thing, and shouted "Mai
Mulele " (Mulele water) when they came into direct contact with enemy fire. There is no
evidence that Mulele's own guerrillas used this slogan, but controversy remains as to
whether Mulele himself led people to believe that he was invulnerable to bullets.
What is highly significant is that in spite of the limited space of his operational theatre,
Mulele came to incarnate the entire "second independence" movement. The label
"Mulelist" was applied to all anti-government guerrillas, including CNL fighters. And
the very periodisation of this phase of the democracy movement is based on the date of
his return to Zaire in 1963 and that of his assassination in 1968. His was a principled
struggle for general welfare and not for selfish gains such as political office and
material benefits. He was so popular that despite a high monetary reward offered to
anyone who would reveal his whereabouts, not a soul was found to betray him. He
returned to Kinshasa via Brazzaville under a false amnesty offer presented to him by
Binza Group member Bomboko on behalf of President Mobutu. The treachery of the
group became once again apparent when Mulele was murdered by Mobutu's generals
shortly after his last return home. Mulele should have known how dangerous it is to
make deals with such treacherous people.
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The CNL-Ied operations in the east constituted the second, largest and militarily more
successful front in the struggle for a "second independence". Unlike the Mulelist
maquis, which attempted to train cadres for a protracted war, the CNL opted for quick
and large scale military operations for the control of provincial capitals and other
administrative and commercial centres. Relying primarily on the youth branches of the
MNC/L and allied parties, the CNL commanders used surprise attacks by lightly armed
but drugged gangs of youths who generally succeeded in overpowering army and
police garrisons and took over cities and towns in rapid succession.
The fighters, who called themselves "Simba" (or lions in Kiswahili) would charge
poorly motivated and frightened security forces in such large number that, regardless of
high casualties, government troops would be so intimidated by the advancing multitude
that they eventually came to believe in the invulnerability of the Simba to their bullets.
After a few major victories, all CNL commanders had to do was to send a telegraph to
the next town or city announcing their impending arrival, and all the garrisons would be
deserted by the security forces.
The militarist strategy of the CNL succeeded in giving it control over nearly two thirds
of the national territory by November 1964. The biggest victory of the campaign was
the successful assault and occupation of Kisangani (then Stanleyville) on August 4,
1964. Shortly after this victory, MNC/L president, Christophe Gbenye, formed a
"revolutionary" government with Gaston Soumialot as defence minister, General
Nicolas Olenga as force commander, and Thomas Kanza as foreign minister. What was
done in Kisangani was replicated in provincial and district headquarters in all CNL-held
territory, where leaders were above all concerned with settling scores against their
political rivals. The first item of business was to occupy the official mansion and to
enjoy the privileges of office, which included money, tradeable commodities like gold,
and a life of pleasure.
Thus, what appeared to be the CNL's main strength, its militarist strategy, turned out to
be its greatest weakness. For, once the hated representatives of the Kinshasa regime
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were ousted and/or executed, CNL leaders began fighting among themselves for the
spoils of victory. Every imaginable weapon, including appeals to ethnic loyalty and the
assassination of rivals, was used in the process. The masses, who had welcomed them
as liberators, would soon become disenchanted not only by the apparent neglect of their
pressing needs, but also by the reign of terror unleashed by the indisciplined hordes of
Simba, who behaved as though they were in conquered territory. These youths also
gave vent to their class-based frustrations by killing large numbers of professionals and
medium to high-level civil servants for the simple reason that they were "intellectuals"
and presumably reactionaries.
All of these weaknesses helped to undermine the ability of the CNL to protect its gains
from the extemally-led counter-insurgency. Because of the support the CNL received
from Nasser's Egypt and the Eastern bloc countries, the counter-insurgency was led by
the United States and included Belgian military experts, anti-Castro Cuban pilots
working for the CIA, and white mercenaries from Europe, South Africa and Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe), working with some elite government units such the former Katanga
gendarmes. Disorganised and relying heavily on magical beliefs, the Simba were an
easy target once they faced opponents who did not share their worldview and beliefs.
As for the CNL leaders, they lacked an appropriate political strategy and were incapable
of mobilising the masses, who had already lost faith in these particular heirs of Patrice
Lumumba. Mobutu and his Binza Group knew these politicians well and considered
them to be less dangerous then Mulele. Unlike the latter, who was assassinated, most
CNL leaders were later welcomed to Zaire by Mobutu, who also gave them the means
with which to go into private business. By 1992. Olenga was already dead and
Soumialot had abandoned politics for commercial farming. At the national conference,
, Christophe Gbenye and Thomas Kanza were now in Mobutu's camp, with Kanza as
the dictator's candidate for Prime Minister against opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi.
Thus, if it is true that imperialism had a lot to do with the defeat of the "second
independence" movement in Zaire, there is no doubt that the leaders of the movement
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made it easier for the external forces by their intellectual bankruptcy and political
opportunism. Only Mulele and his top lieutenants seem to be above reproach, although
they failed to exploit his popularity and mass appeal to the full by breaking out of their
isolation in the Kwilu and geographically expanding their area of operation. Questions
will also remain whether it was a good idea for Mulele to establish the maquis in' his
own area of origin rather than elsewhere, so as to maximise his role as a national
leader.
In the final analysis, the "second independence" movement was a major event in the
popular struggle for democracy in Zaire. Other than the continuation of the liberation
struggle by the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) after independence, our
country was the first to have a liberation war against the post-colonial state in Africa. A
culture of resistance against state authority has remained a major feature of Zairean
political life.
THE STRUGGLE FOR MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY, 1980-1994
The long interval between the second and third major phases of the democracy
movement in Zaire should in no way suggest that our people had given up the fight for
freedom between 1968 and 1980. The banner was actually taken up in 1968 by the
student movement, which continued to pose the main challenge to the Mobutu regime
during the next three years. The Union Generate des Etudiants Congolais (UGEC), a
militant student organisation founded in 1961 to carry on the nationalist agenda that
Lumumba had left unfulfilled, staged a demonstration, with eggs and tomatoes, against
visiting US President Hubert Humphrey. Mobutu's newly created party, the
Mouvement Populaire de Id Revolution (MPR), took advantage of this incident to ban
UGEC. The regime was then planning to monopolise organisational life in all
institutions of higher education, with the youth branch of the party, the JMPR, as the
sole representative of student interests.
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But the following year, on June, 1969, students at the Catholic University of Lovanium
staged a massive anti-government demonstration in Kinshasa, demanding increased
support for their academic and social needs. The regime responded with deadly force,
leaving 60 or more students dead.16 Violence erupted again two years later, when
Lovanium students held a memorial service for their fallen comrades. This time, the
punishment for them and for students at the State University in Lubumbashi who held a
sympathy demonstration, was to enrol all of them in the armed forces. The MPR- then
moved to nationalise Lovanium and the Congo Free University (Protestant) in
Kisangani to create a single national university with campuses at Kinshasa,
Lubumbashi and Kisangani. This was the beginning of the destruction of higher
education by the Mobutu regime.
With its education policy already causing great concern with a very powerful Catholic
, Church, perhaps the most important on the African continent, the regime embarked on
its so-called authenticity drive following the change of the country's name from
"Congo" to "Zaire" on October 27, 1971. The banning of Christian names and the
requirement that students in Catholic seminaries take part in JMPR activities brought
church arid state on a collision course. Led by Joseph Cardinal Malula, the Catholic
Church replaced the student movement as the major opposition to the regime between
1971 and 1975.
Since the MPR was institutionalised in 1970 as the supreme organ of the state, all the
political space was now monopolised by the party-state. Women, student, labour and
youth organisations lost their independent existence to become branches of the party.
Thus, besides religious organisations, which had the possibility of retaining some
autonomy, only underground and exile groups could still challenge the regime. Thanks
to a relatively well-organised security apparatus, underground groups were virtually
non-existent, except for one remnant of the CNL organisation still waging a low-
intensity and sporadic guerrilla activity in the mountainous region along Lake
Tanganyika, Laurent Kabila's Parti de la Revolution Populaire (PRP). The PRP made
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the headlines in 1975 when it kidnapped a group of American university students doing
research on chimpanzees on the Tanzanian side of the great lake.
The main opposition to the regime at this time came from groups in exile. Of these,
only two are worth mentioning for their contribution to the evolution of the political
situation in the country. The first was a small group of exiles in Belgium calling itself
the Mouvement d'Action pour la Resurrection du Congo{ MARC). Left to itself, the
group would most probably have made very little impact in Zaire. But in a one-party
system where a presidential monarch seeks unanimity and where serious criticism and
nasty remarks or insults are crimes of Use majesti, the work of MARC amounted to
more than little nuisance for the regime. The group's paper, Miso Gaa ("Open Your
Eyes" or "Be Vigilant"), carried embarrassing revelations concerning Mobutu, his
family and his close associates. As with all banned reading materials, issues of the
paper were regularly smuggled into the country and widely read by the informed
public. In 1975, the regime invented an aborted coup d'etat (coup monti et manque") m
which MARC leader, Kanyonga Mobateli, was allegedly implicated. He was
condemned to death in absentia but later assassinated in Brussels. The coup and the
assassination were a successful attempt to weaken the group and a warning to potential
followers in Zaire on the danger facing political dissenters.
The second group, and the one that did make history in a big way, is the Front de
Liberation Rationale Congolais (FLNC). This was a military organisation of Zairean
refugees in Angola who launched two invasions of their homeland in 1977 and 1978.
These are known as the Shaba wars: Shaba I and Shaba II, respectively. In each
instance, Mobutu's army was decisively routed, leaving the rebels in control of the
strategic mining centre of Kolwezi and threatening to expand control in the rich
province so as to strangulate Kinshasa economically and then overthrow Mobutu. To
retain his power, the Zairean dictator had to rely on foreign military intervention by
France, Morocco and Belgium, with US logical support.
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In the wake of Shaba I, Mobutu was pressured by his external patrons to leave the day-
to-day management of the government to a prime minister and to liberalise the system.
Weakened by internal dissent and by open popular support for the FLNC invasions,
Mobutu gave in to these pressures. As a result, the 1977 parliamentary elections were
the freest vote possible under a one-party dictatorship. Candidates did not have to be
handpicked by the MPR political bureau, thus encouraging many independent-minded
people to run for office. The new parliament was more assertive of its legislative
authority then its predecessors. And it is out of it that the leaders of the new phase of
the democracy movement would emerge in 1980.
Thirteen members of parliament sent a 52-page letter to Mobutu in December 1980
demanding political reforms. By this time, Mobutu had already managed to clip the
parliament's wings, thanks to diminished concern with the human rights situation in
Zaire by Washington, then distracted by its Cold War priorities in the Horn of Africa
and in Afghanistan as well as by the Iranian hostage crisis. For their audacity, the
Group of 13 members were jailed, tortured and banished to remove detention centres.
In spite of this repression, most of them continued to fight for democracy. During a
brief release from detention in 1982, they defied the regime by founding a party of their
own, the Union pour la Dtmocratie et le Progres Social (UDPS). Although illegal, the
new party became instantly popular with the masses. In 1988, UDPS leader, Etienne
Tshisekedi, chose January 17, the anniversary of Lumumba's assassination, to launch
a pro-democracy demonstration in Kinshasa. Thousands of ordinary people answered
the call to join the march, held at a very symbolic location in the city, the Kasa-Vubu
bridge.
By January 1990, Mobutu had been so overwhelmed by internal and external pressures
for change that he decided to launch an exercise called "Popular Consultations" on the
country's future. Individuals and groups were asked to send memoranda to a special
commissioner stating what was wrong with the system and what should be done about
it. Over 6 000 memoranda were recorded. Unfortunately, the public was never told
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what they. said. What is clear from those that were leaked to the press and from the
public fora that Mobutu himself attended briefly as part of the consultation exercise
before he was forced to abandon the idea for fear of further embarrassment, is that the
popular verdict was against him. The problem, he was frequently told at public fora, "is
you, Citizen President". The. solution was his departure and the establishment of a
multi-party democratic system.
Were Mobutu a patriot who loved his country and a dignified ruler who respected
himself, he would have resigned. We are dealing here not with a normal type of
political regime but with a kleptocracy bent on promoting its narrow group interests to
the detriment of the general welfare. It has destroyed the economic and social fabric of
the country while continuing to enrich itself. While the infrastructure of production has
virtually collapsed, the regime and its collaborators in. the expatriate Lebanese
community are depriving the state of needed revenues by channelling much of the
production of diamonds and gold into the informal circuits so as to maximise their
earnings. The nature of the system as a kleptocracy based on state-sponsored banditry
is evident whenever Mobutu sends tanks to encircle the central bank, the customs
headquarters and the general tax office to ensure that they remain his private cash
boxes.
On April 24,1990, Mobutu announced to the nation that he was abandoning the single-
party system. Within a few months, most of his well known collaborators, including
former prime ministers, ministers and other high-level officials, pretended to abandon
him to found their own opposition parties. These and nearly all other parties created
after April 1990 do not have a mass base. They are for the most part cliques of
ambitious individuals who are positioning themselves for political office in the new
order. Some of the party founders hoped that by identifying themselves with change,
they would be spared punishment by the people and/or judicial pursuits for crimes
committed during the Mobutu era.
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It is mostly those parties known for their fight against the dictatorship before 1990
which seem to enjoy a high degree of popular support. These include the MNC/L, the
Parti Lumumbiste Uriifie (PALU) of Antoine Gizenga and the UDPS. Despite its
disintegration into a dozen or so factions, the party of Patrice Lumumba is still capable
of attracting large numbers of people to rallies in its historic strongholds such as
Kisangani. Initially founded in 1962 but revived in the late 1980s, PALU has a strong
constituency among former PSA supporters and their children. It earned some notoriety
in Kinshasa for the rallies of women and young people organised by Madame The'rese
Pakassa, who earned herself the label of "dame defer" (iron lady) of Zaire.
There is no doubt, however, that it is the UDPS which enjoys the greatest support
among the mass of the people. This is due primarily to the popularity of its major .
leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, who has captivated the popular mind by his courage and
strong commitment to change in the face of a brutal regime. In February 1991, when
Tshisekedi returned home after attending a major conference on Zaire at Howard
University in Washington and making a tour of several US cities and European
capitals, he was welcomed as a national hero. Over a million people, or about one
quarter of the population of Kinshasa, came out to greet him. The cortege from N'Djili
Airport to his residence in Limete, a distance of approximately 12 kilometres, lasted
about eight hours.
In a popular culture heavily marked by a fundamentalist reading of the Christian
message, the popular masses have no problem combining the sacred with the profane
like using melodies and ideas from Church music in the music of political struggle.
Thus, as Ndaywell writes in his monograph, "God and Satan have names in Zaire":
one is Tshitshi and the other Mobutu.17 The flip side of the demonisation of Mobutu is
the elevation of Tshisekedi to the level of sainthood. He is, among other religiously
inspired epithets, "Moises", with the power to deliver his people from bondage; "Uncle
Tshitshi", a good-hearted, generous and wonderful guy; and the "hammer" that will
break the rock with which Mobutu bars our journey to freedom and prosperity.
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The people's devotion to Tshisekedi as an individual, together with their depiction of
the struggle for democracy in religious terms as a duel between the forces of good
(Tshisekedi) and the forces of evil (Mobutu) underlines both the strengths and
weaknesses of the democracy movement in Zaire today. The religious fervour of the
popular commitment to change has undoubtedly weakened the Mobutu regime. In a
country where any saying by the dictator was tantamount to law, the rapid and
irreversible disintegration of Mobutu's authority is nothing but phe'nomenal. The
Zairean president no longer feels at home in Kinshasa, where his motorcade is likely to
be met by rocks thrown by angry young people. When he does visit the capital, he is
escorted by helicopters, tanks and armoured cars. He therefore prefers the security of
Gbadplite, a new town built on the border with the Central African Republic, where he
is free to live in kingly fashion in his Versailles-type palace. .
On the other hand, the people's radical dichotomy between good and evil* change and
status quo, and other similar opposites does not reflect the complexity of the political
situation in Zaire today. There is a marked discordance between the radicalism of the
masses and the desire for radical change, on the one hand, and the primary interest of
their political leaders in obtaining government positions, on the other. Thus, whenever
the opposition leadership is pushed by whatever factor — idealism, principle, fear or
intimidation — closer to the position of the popular masses, a political.impasse is
created as long as the democratic forces are strong enough to prevent,the regime from
governing effectively but are still too weak to overthrow, the dictatorship. When,.it is
guided by opportunism or caught up in the logic of political compromise, it is likely to
betray the deepest aspirations of the masses.
This, in short, is the record of the democracy movement during the last three decades in
Zaire. Until July 1991, when the democratic opposition formed a coalition known as
the Union Sacree (Sacred Union), the leadership held a position identical to the
people's that Mobutu's departure from office was a precondition for genuine change
and democratisation. Then, during the same month, everyone was surprised to hear an
announcement on national television that Mobutu had appointed Tshisekedi Prime
Minister. Secret negotiations had apparently been going on between the two men
through trusted aides. Demonstrators descended on Tshisekedi's residence to force him
to back down. Their "saviour", the masses thought, should not work with the "devil".
Although bowing to popular pressure, Tshisekedi made it clear that he was prepared to
accept the post, as this would have given him the opportunity to organise and manage
the national conference that so many people wanted held. The incident created strained
relations between him and his senior partners in the Union Sacree, all of whom were
jealous of him and would have jumped at the opportunity to head the government, as
Nguza Karl I Bond did four months later. It also revealed the elitist and undemocratic
strain of bourgeois politics worldwide, with politicians preferring to solve leadership
and other important questions through deal-making — in smoke-filled (or, nowadays,
in smoke-free) rooms — rather than through open democratic processes. Thus, each
time that the democratic process seemed to he going forward, something would happen
to bring the politicians back to deal-making behind closed doors, away from the
watchful eyes of the people.
The long-awaited national conference opened on August 7,1991, only to be disrupted
in September as a result of looting by poorly paid soldiers. The conference itself was so
mired in procedural disputes that the new crisis seemed to offer the politicians the
opportunity they wanted to go back to the negotiating table. This they did at Mobutu's
Marble Palace in Binza, Kinshasa. Under foreign pressure, it was agreed that
cohabitation by Mobutu and Tshisekedi was essential to peace, economic recovery and
the progress of the democratisation process. Disappointed but hopeful that their
"Moises" would after all find a way to eventually get rid of Mobutu, the people
reluctantly accepted the fact that he will serve as Mobutu's Prime Minister. It did not
take long for things to fall apart. No longer able to have access to ready cash at the
central bank, Mobutu dismissed Tshisekedi and his government, ordering his army to
lock them out of their offices.
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When other attempts at mediation failed to satisfy all concerned, hopes for change were
once again invested in the national conference which resumed its work before the end
of 1991. On January 19,1992, Prime Minister Nguza arbitrarily closed the conference.
As in the past, ordinary people stepped in to change the situation. Responding to a call
by the Catholic Church and other religious groups, thousands of people left church on
Sunday, February 16, 1992, candle and Bible in hand, to join massive demonstrations
all over Kinshasa in a Christian march for reopening the national conference. Mobutu's
army opened fire, killing over 30 people. To the martyrs of independence who fell on
Sunday, January 4,1959, were now added the "martyrs of democracy". Their sacrifice
would compel the dictator to give in to internal and external pressures by reopening the
conference.
The Conference Nationale Souveraine (CNS) met uninterrupted between April 6 and
December 6, 1992. A total of 2 842 delegates, representing all classes and strata of
Zairean society, qualified to seat as the "people in conference". Their task was to take
stock of what had gone wrong during the first 32 years of our history and chart a new
course for the future. Just as the conference got into full swing with 23 committees and
over 100 subcommittees examining all aspects of the country's history and affairs, the
elitist logic of the politicians once again reared its ugly head. Under pressure from the
United States, the conference president, Kisangani Roman Catholic Archbishop
Laurent Monsengwo, insisted that negotiations between representative groups at the
conference and Mobutu's aides take place at N'Sele to determine the institutional
framework of the transition to democracy.
With few exceptions, all the major groups, including the Union Sacrie, went along
with this plan, which was a blatant violation of CNS sovereignty and its rules of order.
What emerged out of the N'Sele deal-making was the comprehensive political
compromise (compromis politique global), a Zairean version of the power-sharing
formula originally drafted by Herman Cohen, then US Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs. The compromise called for Mobutu to remain president during a two-
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year transitional period, but this time as a ceremonial rather than executive head of state.
That the compromise was undemocratic and contrary to the wishes of the people did not
seem to bother the leadership of the democratic opposition, since its major
preoccupation was getting a parcel of power with Tshisekedi as Prime Minister.
Having betrayed the people with the compromise, the democratic opposition sought to
please them with symbolic gimmicks such as changing the country's name from "Zaire"
to "Congo", a move that Mobutu succeeded to neutralise. Crucial issues such as the fate
of Mobutu's old parliament, the status of his single-party constitution and the concrete
mechanisms of collaboration between the president and the prime minister in the areas
of foreign affairs and national security were left extremely vague, with loopholes that
the wily dictator could later exploit to his advantage. The democratic opposition
displayed an amazing degree of naivete in concentrating all energies on winning the
post of prime minister while neglecting these crucial issues.
With determination, the masses did air they could to make sure that the "people's
candidate" for prime minister was elected by the CNS. All over Kinshasa, the radio
trottoir (sidewalk radio) and the opposition press informed the public that should CNS
members choose someone other than the people's candidate, Tshisekedi, they will have
some explaining to do, while being dilapidated. And on the night of the vote, which
took place between 5 p.m. on August 14, to 5 a.m. on August 15, the People's Palace,
the CNS venue, was encircled by large numbers of people eager to get the results of the
balloting. Those who stayed home were even in a better position to follow, through
television and radio, the finest and most transparent election ever held in Mobutu's
Zaire. Being representatives of the people, the majority of delegates voted freely and
willingly for Tshisekedi, who beat Thomas Kanza, the candidate of the status quo, by
71 percent to 27 percent of the vote cast. The whole country erupted into a joyful
victory dance from dawn to sunset on the 15th of August 1992.
Less than four months later, the people's victory turned out to be hollow. After his
friend and ally Jonas Savimbi defied international public opinion and went back to war
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after losing a free and fair election, Mobutu did not see why he should live with a
situation he disliked. He carried out the third coup d'etat of his political career on
December 1, 1992. In March 1993, he named a rival government, went back to his old
constitution and convened his old parliament. In all this, he was encouraged by the fact
that his former patrons in Washington, Paris and Brussels talked tough but did nothing.
They called upon the Zairean political class to go back to the negotiating table, as
though the national conference had never taken place.
Rather than defending the institutional framework adopted by the CNS that he had
chaired, Monsignor Monsengwo showed his true colors by adopting the Western call
for more negotiations. For him, important decisions on a country's future had to be
made by the political class rather then a representative peoples' assembly. In going
along with this elitist thinking, the Zairean political class, including the so-called radical
opposition represented by the Union Sacree, showed utter contempt for democratic
procedures and for democracy itself. Deal-making among politicians seems to make
more sense to them than decisions reached through a democratic process like the
national conference.
In the end, Mobutu came out victorious. Negotiations began in September 1993, under
Western and UN pressures ended in January 1994. The results can only be read as the
restoration of the ancient regime, with President Mobutu recovering virtually all his pre-
CNS executive powers. Only in Zaire could a transitional process from dictatorship to
democracy remain under the control of the dictator himself. The January 1994 prowcole
d'accord merged Mobutu's one-parry parliament with the provisional legislature elected
by the CNS to give Mobutu a majority in a new and monstrous parliament of 780
members.
Using all the tricks of a Machiavellian handbook, Mobutu and his followers succeeded
in dumping Prime Minister Tshisekedi in favour of Kengo wa Dondo, the candidate of
the Western Troika (United States, France and Belgium) and the Bretton Woods
institutions. For these external forces, a technocrat without a political base in the
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country like Kengo is preferable to Tshisekedi, a man of the people who is more likely
to listen to his national constituency — as he did in July 1991 — than to be beholden to
foreign patrons. With Kengo, the defeat of the democracy movement is all the more
blatant for the simple fact that it is he who was Mobutu's prime minister on April 24,
1990! Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
CONCLUSION
Since 1956, the people of Zaire have waged a major struggle for democratic rights,
with the hope of improving their lot and ensuring a better future for their children. The
struggle has gone through three major phases, corresponding to the fight for
independence (1956-60), the revolt against the failure of the post-colonial state to fulfill
the people's expectations of independence (1963-68) and the current movement for
multi-party democracy, since 1980, respectively. During each of these phases, the
democracy movement relied on a high level of mass mobilisation to weaken the enemy.
Just as entire regions of the country became ungovernable during the last 18 months of
Belgian colonialism, nearly two thirds of the country fell under the control of
Lumumbist forces in 1964, and Mobutu has gone through six prime ministers since
1990 without succeeding in effectively governing the country.
Unfortunately, the very popular culture which helps to weaken the enemy and gives the
democracy movement its basic strength also undermines it in several respects. For
example, resort to cultural values and symbols during the first two phases of the
movement was effectively exploited by the enemy to divide people along ethnic lines.
Today, there are other weaknesses associated with popular culture. Although the
modern sector of the economy and the public infrastructure of social services have
collapsed, traditional solidarity mechanisms continue to help people survive and thus
diminish the urgency of a frontal attack on the core supports of the dictatorship.
Similarly, reliance on religious beliefs, with so much time spent in prayer meetings —
30
in which dead heroes like Kimbangu, Malula, Kasa-Vubu, Lumumba and others are
asked to intercede with God for our deliverance — and with unlimited faith in a saviour
called "Moises", makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the masses to make their own
revolution.18
Finally, a major problem or even a handicap for the democracy movement in Zaire has
been the question of leadership. The politicians who arise to lead the movement are, for
the most part, self-centred seekers of political power and material benefits: the evolute
who were fighting to integrate the top layers of colonial society; the Lumumbists who
wanted to regain the power they had lost to the Binza Group; and hundreds of
Mobutu's former associates who are attempting to position themselves for a new
dispensation in the post-Mobutu era.
Hopes raised by the emergence of a single charismatic individual as standard-bearer of
the movement in each of its major phases — Lumumba in 1958-60, Mulele in 1963-68,
and Tshisekedi today — ended up being dashed. For, however successful these three
were in mobilising the masses, their victories over the enemy were shortlived. They
were incapable of delivering the goods to their followers, since they were defeated
before they could govern by their enemies in the political class, who relied on their
control over the key organs of state power — the repressive apparatus and the central
bank — as well as on Western support.
The three leaders failed in part because they did not succeed in building a strong
political organisation likely to wrestle political power from the enemy and to govern
effectively. Mass support in the absence of a strong organisation tnd an appropriate
political strategy is not enough for effective political change. Lumumba, Mulele and
Tshisekedi were also weakened by the deals and compromises they were forced to
make as part of a political culture that puts less emphasis on respect for the democratic
process of open debate and transparent decision-making then on deal-making among
politicians.
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